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COMPETITION LAW AND THE AGENDA
FOR THE WTO: FORGING THE LINKS
OF COMPETITION AND TRADE
Eleanor M. Foxt
Abstract: The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is
complete, and the agenda for the next round is being formulated. It is widely expected
that issues of competition, the environment, and possibly labor will be on the agenda for
the next round of the GATT. This article examines why it is that the world trading
agenda may be thus expanding. Specifically as to competition law, it examines the
history of devising world competition rules, the wisdom of revisiting the enterprise of
doing so, and alternative approaches to competition in the GATT agenda. The-article
concludes with a modest proposal for forging the links between competition and trade in
the context of the GATT.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
is complete, and formulation of the agenda for the next round of the world
trading body - the World Trade Organization ("WTO") - is underway.
Issues of competition, the environment, and possibly labor are expected to
appear on the agenda. This article examines why it is that the world trading
agenda is thus expanding. Additionally, it examines the history of devising
world competition rules and the new symbiosis between trade and competi-
tion law, and it offers a focused approach to world competition policy in the
context of the WTO. Finally, it argues for the creation of an enterprise that
will deliberately forge the linkage between competition and trade.
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
Since the late 1920s under the auspices of the League of Nations, in-
ternational cartels have been identified as an enemy of world trade. In the
1930s, even while cartels gained respectability in the United States as a
means to lift the country out of depression, fascist governments used cartels
for political ends. In U.S. Congressional hearings, a pattern of cartels in
support of totalitarianism began to emerge. Thurman Arnold, Assistant
Attorney General under President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the late 1930s,
launched aggressive antitrust attacks against such cartels. In 1944,
President Roosevelt proposed action to curb international cartels under the
auspices of the United Nations. Measures to protect competition in world
trade were included in the draft foundational document for the International
Trade Organization ("ITO"), the Havana Charter.I
The draft Havana Charter would have obliged the members of the
proposed ITO to take "appropriate" measures to prevent private commercial
enterprises that had "effective control of trade" from "restrain[ing]
I HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78
(1948), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ICITO/I/4 (1948).
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competition, limit[ing] access to markets, or foster[ing] monopolistic con-
trol in international trade" where such conduct would "have harmful effects
on production and trade and interfere with the achievement" of the charter's
objectives.2 Harmful effects were presumed (though rebuttable) in the case
of price fixing, allocation of markets, boycotts, suppression of technology,
unauthorized extension of patent monopolies, and other specified conduct.3
Under the Havana Charter, member nations would have been entitled
to complain to the ITO about prohibited restraints. The ITO would have
been authorized to investigate and to demand information in the course of
its investigation, and to recommend remedial action to the government of
member nations.4 Upon finding a complaint valid, the ITO would have
been required to publish its findings and request full reports from the of-
fending member state about the progress of its remedial measures. The
member state would have been obliged to "take in the particular case the
action it considers appropriate having regard to its obligations under this
Charter." 5
However, in view of waning support and mounting opposition in the
U.S. Congress, the Charter never came to the floor of the Congress, and the
United States is credited or blamed for the demise of the ITO.6 The incho-
ate ITO became the precursor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (the GATT), which set the world on a course towards more liberal
trade. However, the GATT has never contained rules on competition.
No significant world antitrust initiative was to be taken again until the
1970s.7 The impulse came from a very different nerve center, also under
the auspices of the United Nations. Multinational enterprises ("MNEs") had
begun to take root and expand. From the point of view of the developing
2 Id. art. 46, ch. V.
3 Id. art. 46(1)-(3). To be subject to the proscription, the enterprisis were required to "possess ef-
fective control of trade among a number of countries in one or more products."4 Id. art.48.
5 Id. art. 50. For a discussion of the competition provisions of the Havana Charter and their fate,
see F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 38 et seq. (1994). See
also George Bronz, The International Trade Organization Charter, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1116 (1949).
6 See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE § 2.2 (2d ed. 1983);
Sigmund Timberg, An International Antitrust Convention: A Proposal to Harmonize Conflicting National
Policies Towards the Multinational Corporation, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 157 (1973).
7 See Eleanor Fox, Harnessing the Multinational Corporation to Enhance Third World
Development-The Rise and Fall and Future ofAntitrust as Regulator, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1981 (1989)
[hereinafter Harnessing the Multinational Corporation]. See also Debra Miller & Joel Davidow, Antitrust
at the United Nations: A Tale of Two Codes, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347, 354 (1982).
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countries, the multinationals were powerful, abusive, and sometimes rapa-
cious. The developing countries (and some others) wanted a system to
control and regulate the business conduct of the multinationals.
Under the aegis of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD"), the industrialized countries, the socialist bloc
countries, and the developing countries came to the bargaining table to ne-
gotiate a Restrictive Business Practices Code ("RBP Code"). The United
States welcomed the invitation to negotiate a world business practices code
because officials believed that they could educate less developed countries
and socialist nations on the virtues of free markets. They hoped at least to
establish a strong anti-cartel principle applicable to state-owned as well as
private enterprise, and to jettison the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine,
which, if applied, could invalidate the MNEs' intrafirm transfer pricing and
export restraints.
After years of negotiation, in 1980, the parties reached agreement on
a voluntary RBP Code. (Its very birth year would signal an anachronism;
the Code was born into the Reagan era.) The RBP Code contains an express
preference for less developed countries. It encourages member nations to
improve and enforce their national antitrust laws; it states that MNEs should
conform to RBP laws of the nations in which they operate; and it provides
that states should cooperate with the authorities in other nations that are
adversely affected by restrictive business practices. The substantive
provisions reflect, essentially, a compromise position between U.S. and
European Community antitrust law. Many provisions are vague, and by the
current U.S. antitrust compass, 8 could handicap strong competitors and
protect weak ones. For example, the Code provides that enterprises should
refrain from "below cost-pricing to eliminate competitors" and from
"[d]iscriminatory (i.e. unjustifiably differentiated) prices, terms or condi-
tions, including by means of internal transfers," when, through an abuse of a
dominant position, the conduct "limit[s] access to markets or otherwise un-
duly restrain[s] competition, having or being likely to have adverse effects
8 U.S. antitrust law today is guided largely by goals of efficiency and consumer interest. See
Eleanor Fox & L. Sullivan, Antitrust - Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From?
Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987); Harnessing the Multinational Corporation, supra
note 7; Eleanor Fox, Antitrust, Trade and the Twenty-first Century - Rounding the Circle, The Handler
Lecture, 48 REC. Ass'N B. CITY OF N.Y. 535 (1993) [hereinafter The Handler Lecture].
In the 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. antitrust law was quite different. It protected small competitors
and sought to preserve diversity and autonomy. The anti-cartel principle, however, has been stable.
Cartels are and for a century have been illegal per se. See id.
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on international trade, particularly that of developing countries, and on the
economic development of these countries .... ,9
During the period of negotiations for the RBP Code, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), comprised of the
industrialized countries of the world, also responded to the perceived need,
for rules to guide multinational enterprises. In 1976, the OECD adopted
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The OECD Guidelines, although
shorter than the eventual RBP Code and without special indulgence for
conduct in the less developed countries, contain many similar suggested
rules. One rule of the Guidelines states that MNEs should refrain from
abusing a dominant position by means of, for example, "(b) predatory be-
havior towards competitors,... [or] (e) discriminatory (i.e., unreasonably
differentiated) pricing [through intrafirm transfers] .... 10
Both systems were put into place just before the U.S. watershed in
antitrust in the early 1980s, which changed U.S. antitrust law's concern with
access, diversity, and governance of markets by competition, to law con-
cerned with efficient outcomes.11  The principles of law reflected in the
RBP Code and in the OECD Guidelines are rooted in a pre-Sylvania,12 pre-
Copperweldl3 and pre-Brooke Group14 world.
The above developments focus on rules of behavior. Through the
years, however, initiatives were taken, also, to moderate jurisdictional
9 U.N. Doc. T.D.-RBP-CONF-10 (1980), reprinted in, 19 I.L.M. 813 (1980). Such a standard could
be interpreted to condemn competition itself. For example, it might be applied to prohibit sustained low-
pricin, by an efficient firm, particularly if domestic firms could not meet the competition.
40 Annex to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises,
OECD Doc. 21 (76) 04/1 (1976), reprinted in 75 DEP'T ST. BULL. 83 (1976). See generally Barry E.
Hawk, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 241 (1977).
11 See sources cited supra note 8. In the mid to late 1970s, the Supreme Court of the United States
put a lid on theretofore expansive antitrust principles. In effect the Court disallowed antitrust enforcement
that could harm consumers.
In the 1980s, during the Reagan Administration, the Justice Department articulated a new paradigm
for antitrust. This new paradigm - of efficiency and consumer interests - gradually became widely
acepted by the courts. See id.
12 Continental TV Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Before Sylvania, it was illegal
per se for a firm, by agreement with its distributors, to limit territories within which or customers to whom
they could sell. See id.
13 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). Copperweldovertumed the
notion that parent corporations and their subsidiaries could conspire within the meaning of section I of the
Sherman Act. Id.
14 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993). Brooke
Group limits the scope of price predation actions by requiring plaintiff to prove that defendant (charged
with below-cost pricing to eliminate competitors) would probably be able to recoup its losses after the
predatory siege.
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disputes among nations and to enhance cooperation in discovery and en-
forcement by nations' enforcement agencies. The United States entered into
Memoranda of Understanding, separately, with Germany,15 Canada,16 and
Australia, 17 and it entered into Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with a
number of nations to enhance cooperation in criminal enforcement.1 8
In September 1991, the United States and the European Commission
signed the most affirmative arrangement yet made to facilitate mutual aid in
discovery and enforcement: the U.S./EC Agreement.' 9 The U.S./EC
Executive Agreement has been held invalid, however, because of a technical
deficiency - approval of the Council of Ministers was required but was not
obtained.20 Nonetheless, because the agreement is considered a progressive
model and it has already influenced the direction of multinational
cooperation, it is important to describe its terms.
The purpose of the U.S./EC Agreement was "to promote cooperation
and coordination and lessen the possibility or impact of differences between
the Parties in the application of their competition laws." 21 The agreement
provided that one party would notify the other whenever their enforcement
activities "may affect important interests"'22 of the other; that officials would
meet at least twice a year to exchange information on enforcement activi-
ties, priorities and policies, and would provide information relevant to the
enforcement activity of the other;23 that competition authorities would assist
each other in enforcement activities where compatible with their interests;
and that where both had an interest in pursuing related situations they could
15 Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23,
1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956.
16 Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to
the Aplication of National Antitrust Laws, March 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., 23 1.L.M. 275.
Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-Austl., 34 U.S.T.
388.
18 For a discussion of the various Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties ("MLATs") which provide for
cooperation in criminal enforcement, see Christopher L. Blakesley et al., Extraterritorial Application of
Criminal Law, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. & PROC. 383 (1991); James i. K. Knapp, Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties As A Way to Pierce Bank Secrecy, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 405 (1988). Thus far the MLATs
have only limited application to antitrust.
19 Agreement Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, September 23, 1991, U.S.-
European Communities, 30 I.L.M. 1487 [the U.S./EC Executive Agreement], invalidated on technical
grounds by EC Court of Justice, Case C-41/93, France v. Commission (unreported, 1994).
20 Id.
21 Id. art. I(1).
22 Id. art. 11(1).
23 Id. art. III.
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coordinate their enforcement activities.24 Where one party believed that
anticompetitive activities carried out in the territory of the other were ad-
versely affecting its important interests, it was entitled to request the other
to initiate appropriate enforcement activities. The latter was required to
consider the request and respond.25 Moreover, to avoid conflicts, where one
party's enforcement activity could adversely affect important interests of
the other, the parties agreed to consider specified comity factors "in seeking
an appropriate accommodation of the competing interests."26
The U.S./EC Executive Agreement has often been cited not only for
its notification, consultations, and restraint provisions, but particularly for
the parties' agreement to consider active assistance to one another in their
enforcement activities. Such mutual undertakings to (sympathetically)
consider giving active assistance is known as positive comity.
In a further development, the U.S. Congress passed the International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act in October of 1994.27 This law
authorizes the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission to enter
into mutual assistance agreements with antitrust agencies of other nations.
Pursuant to such agreements, the U.S. agencies may share certain confiden-
tial investigative information with other nations when appropriate in view of
expected reciprocity. Moreover, the Justice Department may subpoena
documents or testimony to assist a foreign agency's antitrust investigation,
even if the suspected violation is beyond the reach of U.S. substantive law.
III. THE WORLD OF THE 1990S
On January 11, 1994, at a press conference in Brussels after talks
with European Commission President Jacques Delors and Greek Prime
Minister Andreas Papandreou, U.S. President Bill Clinton told reporters that
the Brussels discussions had included the "new generation" of trade issues
such as competition, the environment, and labor standards, and he
24 Id. art. IV.
25 Id. arL V.
26 Id. art. VI (3).
27 International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-438, 108 Stat. 4597
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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advocated placing all three items on the agenda for the next round of the
GAT!T/WTO.28
We ask here why the WTO agenda may be thus extended. Has the
world so changed as to demand a new or more complete vision of interna-
tional antitrust, the environment, and labor standards? Has this need so
increased as to change the balance of preferences from a jealous safeguard-
ing of "sovereignty" to a cosmopolitan search for more coherent treatment
of problems with a global dimension?
The world has changed. The global economy at the turn of the
twenty-first century is more dynamic and free flowing than in decades
earlier. Spurred by high technology, telecommunications and ease of data
and currency transfers, global transactions swirl over national borders
rendering the borders themselves largely irrelevant to the conduct of
business. Firms commonly have multi-national locations and seek the
lowest cost inputs around the world. Currency transfers occur electronically
and instantly. Just as in the 1880s and 1890s when the opening of the
railroad lines seemed to shrink the United States, telecommunications,
cable, the computer, and fluid financial market transactions, combined with
a lowering of trade barriers through successive rounds of the GATT, have
shrunk the world in the 1980s and 1990s.
As transactions without borders increase, they put increasing pressure
on governments to expand free trade in the name of competitiveness; and as
freer trade begets freer trade, we observe two phenomena:
1. Businesses in nations with high standards and high costs of regu-
lation, such as those associated with evironmental and labor regulation, may
perceive themselves as besieged with low-priced imports from nations that
do not impose these obligations; and the "besieged" competitors claim
"unfair competition" and "illegitimate comparative advantage." Businesses
mobilize their governments to reestablish barriers to low-priced goods, or to
raise the price of those goods directly.
(a) Business people in a nation with higher costs of regulation may
form coalitions with environmentalists and supporters of better conditions
28 The President's News Conference with European Union Leaders in Brussels, 30 WKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 33 (Jan. 1I, 1994); Lionel Barber, Clinton Places Environment on Top in GA7T, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1994, at 6.
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for workers in an effort to lift the level of protection (and consequently raise
costs) in the rest of the world.
(b) Businesses in nations with lower barriers may fear the loss of
"their own" markets and seek to keep their markets by market division
agreements and other private restraints of trade, and by invoking trade laws.
(c) Governments of nations in which businesses are newly vulnerable
to foreign competition, while constrained against GATT-illegal conduct,
may find new ways to protect their nationals from foreign competition,
often combining public and private action. They may subsidize nationals or
place road blocks in the path of non-nationals.
2. Because of increasingly integral transnational transactions, the
need increases for a coherent "vision from the top" with attendant common
policy, and in the absence of common policy, for procedural mechanisms to
resolve clashes ofjurisdiction and clashes of national laws.
These new pressures and new incentives are complicated by the fact
that, in international and national law, government action and private action
have been compartmentalized, and "sovereignty" has become a talismanic
word. Government restraints of trade are governed by the GATT (WTO) or
bilateral or regional agreements, while private restraints of trade are gov-
erned by the competition laws of the nations. A meaningful system of
international antitrust has been avoided for fear of loss of national control
and the related fear that world negotiations will inevitably entail compro-
mising principle. The world of the 1990s may call for a rethinking of the
sanctity of sovereignty and indeed a rethinking of the equation of
sovereignty with no (more) world rules.
This article suggests that competition can no longer be separated from
trade, that the competition law of one nation can no longer be isolated from
that of other nations, and that public restraints can no longer be segmented
from private restraints. Perhaps the time has come for a new generation of
agreement exemplified by a more focused Havana Charter that forbids the
most egregious and most friction-creating anticompetitive restraints in
world trade. At the very least, the time is ripe to entertain the concept of
some mutually agreed principles of substantive law, jurisdiction and dispute
resolution at the intersection of antitrust and trade; and having identified
such principles, to assess the costs and benefits of embracing them.
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
In sum, antitrust has periodically surfaced on the world agenda. In
the 1940s, the concern was driven by the horror of world cartels that were
used by fascist governments to reinforce their power. In the 1960s and
1970s, the concern was triggered by the growth of multinational corpora-
tions and their perceived social, political and economic power to shut off
opportunity for outsiders and to repress less developed nations. The 1980s
witnessed an unleashing of world competition along with freer trade, dissi-
pating much of the market power that large corporations had accumulated in
the 1960s. The years 1989 and 1990 saw attempts to construct free en-
terprise economies from the ashes of communism. Freer competition and
trade continues to break down economic and political power and to create
incentives for new forms of nationalism and protectionism, on the one hand,
and for new avenues for progressive, integral world transactions, on the
other hand. Competition law and trade law have met. The two questions
are: First, how should we seek to forge their linkages? Second, is the crea-
tion of a program designed to establish these linkages worth its costs?
IV. DEVELOPING AN AGENDA
A. An International Versus a National Approach
There are three basic approaches to thinking about competition law
and the world trading regime. One is to contemplate a rather complete in-
ternational competition law system, and to draft a world competition code.
This is the approach taken by the Munich group, in which I participated,
whose proposed International Antitrust Code was released last fall as a
GATT Plurilateral Agreement.29
A second approach is to identify specific tensions and opportunities
that present themselves in the context of the world competition/trading sys-
tem, and to formulate a narrowly focused agenda in response. It would start
with a vision of freedom of trade in global commerce and link competition
to trade at a constitutional level of generality. A third approach begins with
an overriding skepticism of the multinational bargaining table. It begins
29 1 was one of the members characterized in the Munich document as rejecting the full-competition-
code approach and endorsing a minimal approach that would embody only 15 principles. The 15 princi-
ples are set forth in the Introduction to the Munich Code, part VIII. The Munich Code is reprinted in 64
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 19, 1993). The alternative minimal approach is included therein
at S-7 to S-9.
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with the strong presumption that all that needs to be done can be done at the
national level with enforcement agency cooperation, and it finds the pre-
sumption unrebutted. 30 The second and third approaches both foster
competition among different antitrust regimes, and both preserve the flexi-
bility of systems to adapt to their own needs, even in realms of global com-
petition.
The first approach has the virtue of a unified approach for the trading
partners of the world. Indeed, if world rules were preemptive for transac-
tions of an international dimension (and if they were reasonably clear and
not too complex), the unified approach would have, for business, the virtue
of simplicity - a single set of rules for the game. Even if world rules are
not preemptive, it may be said, players in a world game should play by
world rules.
There are costs, however, associated with the comprehensive ap-
proach. It may require a rather complicated enforcement and adjudication
system, which may create a growing bureaucracy. Moreover, the very no-
tion implies that there is a set of optimal antitrust rules that fit all businesses
and nations of the world, and that nations can identify and reach agreement
on these rules through negotiation. But optimal rules may be context and
culture specific, and negotiations imply bargaining and trade-offs and may
yield rules formed more by politics than principle. Finally, if agreement
were reached on a set of world rules, inflexibility would be inevitable.
Diversity and roots-up growth would be limited and the law itself may be
unresponsive to social and economic change.
The second, targeted constitutional approach has the virtue of avoid-
ing bureaucracy and rigidity while providing a global vision. It would
preserve diversity and accept national choice tailored to context, except
where a nation chooses to impose costs on others. It has the costs (as well
as the virtues) of foregoing a uniform, comprehensive system, and it does
entail a modest limit on national choice in the interests of the greater good,
as noted above.
The third national approach has the virtue, to a nation, of not giving
anything "away," but the cost of not accounting for benefits of a world vi-
sion or the costs of narrowly nationalistic ambitions.
30 An expansive jurisdictional reach of national law, such as the U.S. Sherman Act, may add to a na-
tion's comfort level that what "needs" to be done can be done by national initiative.
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This article gives shape to the targeted constitutional approach. It
proceeds on the hypothesis that international problems call for some inter-
national solutions, but that diversity is desirable and should be preserved to
the extent that tailored solutions can meet the major problems caused by
disharmony and lack of unified vision in the world competition/trading
system. The process of formulating a targeted constitutional approach in-
vites one to articulate exactly where the problems lie and how they can be
specifically addressed, which itself should increase understanding about the
problems and their solutions.
Accordingly, the article inquires into ways in which the competition
laws of nations, and in which competition laws and trade laws, tend to
conflict and thereby foster disputes among nations. Proactively, it seeks to
identify specific ways in which coordination may perceptibly enhance the
economic welfare of the citizen of the community of nations.
By giving specific form to the targeted constitutional approach, this
article should enable the reader to compare it with both the comprehensive
code approach and the solely-national-with-reciprocity approach and to
consider their relative merits.
This article proceeds on the premise that people are better off by
maximizing world economic welfare rather than by maximizing their na-
tion's power vis-A-vis the power of other nations in the world. Moreover,
the attempt to maximize a nation's relative power advantage is a strategy
increasingly less likely to succeed and increasingly less attractive as multi-
nationals freely move their resources around the world. This article is based
on the judgment that nations (and their people) should and could be con-
vinced- not to trade off the economic well-being of their people for the
nation's relative power advantage, but rather to maximize welfare in the
larger community. They may need to be assured, however, that their trading
partners will follow the same course. The proposal in this article provides a
framework for such assurance.
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B. Identifying the Frictions
1. One Nation's Competition Law Against Other Nations' Competition
Law
The first inquiry is whether substantive differences in the competition
laws of nations cause disharmony in the form of frictions in the world trad-
ing/competition system.
There are two principal ways in which disharmonious law may cause
such tension. One problem may be illustrated by a reference to environ-
mental law or labor law. If standards in Nation A are high and costly to
meet, and standards in Nation B are nonexistent, free trade from B into A
may cause trade tensions (whether or not the "problem" should be "solved"
or tolerated).
This problem does not exist with regard to competition law. Antitrust
is market-freeing, not market regulating. Antitrust law does not steer con-
duct into cost-increasing channels, as do obligations to clean the air or
water. Rather, the market system safeguarded by antitrust enforcement
tends to lower costs. 3 1 Some exceptions can be cited. For example, the
abuse of the dominance law of the European Union may sometimes increase
the dominant firm's costs of doing business. Even so, such law is
calculated to increase access or lower the costs of smaller firms, and the net
effect anticipated by the regulating community is cost-reducing.
U.S. antitrust law, as it exists in the 1990s, is clearly not cost-increas-
ing. U.S. antitrust constraints have been notably minimized in the past
fifteen years. There is no basis for U.S. firms to fear that their foreign
counterparts have lower costs because of lower antitrust standards and that
their foreign competitors might therefore wage "unfair" competition.
32
31 Of course, all law entails costs of enforcement, and some nations may have inefficiently high costs
of enforcement. If, however, Nation A operates an inefficient enforcement system, that fact does not give
rise to a credible claim: "We pay these high costs. Your firms compete with ours; therefore you must
makeyour system inefficient, too, and we will play on a level playing field."
32 Assertions to this effect had some credibility in the 1960s, when the United States might arguably
have "paid" something for antitrust in return for the perceived social and political benefits of a society of
entrepreneurs. By the 1980s, however, the country perceived that its investment in "protectionist" antitrust
was not worth its cost. In the 1990s, U.S. antitrust law is efficiency oriented. While some U.S. firms and
some theorists still claim that U.S. antitrust handicaps efficient firms in world competition, at best the claim
concerns a very small margin of big business collaboration, and even then the claim it is highly contestable.
The United States has one of the least interventionist antitrust systems in the world today.
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A second problem may be illustrated by reference to intellectual
property law. If Nation A has intellectual property protection and Nation B
does not, free trade in copied goods from B into A may cause trade tensions.
Firms in B may free ride on the investments in innovation made by firms in
A and thereby undermine the incentives of firms in A to invent, reflecting
unfair competition. Again, disparities in competition law pose no such
problems. There is no free rider implication from disparities in antitrust
treatment.
National differences in legal standards, including competition law
standards, do increase the costs of doing business. Business firms and their
advisors must learn and keep abreast of a multitude of legal systems. Firms
may be obliged to devise one system of distribution for the European com-
mon market and another for the U.S. market. They must follow numerous
sets of reporting and waiting requirements to obtain approval of a single
transnational merger. Certain harmonious approaches could decrease these
costs. This phenomenon presents an opportunity for efficiency, which
should be taken, but it does not reflect a trade tension among nations.
2. Competition Law Versus Nonenforcement of Competition Law, and
the Problem of Closed Foreign Markets
Artificial market closure plainly gives rise to trade tensions. Where
market entry is barred or deterred by means of private rather than govern-
ment action, and where the closure or barrier constitutes an antitrust
violation, then antitrust law is an available means to dispel the tension. If
the home nation refuses or declines to initiate enforcement against antitrust
violations, nonenforcement of antitrust can create trade tensions.
The problem of closed foreign markets is one of the most serious
competition/trade problems today. The problem became prominent in the
course of the U.S./Japan Structural Impediments Initiative launched in
1989. At that time, the United States announced its intention to use antitrust
law to pry open foreign markets that had been closed by host-country com-
petitors' conspiracies to boycott foreign goods. U.S. officials stated that, if
Nor does one hear nations with antitrust that aims to protect a society of small business argue that
other nations (such as the United States) have an illegitimate comparative advantage because of their effi-
ciency orientation. No attempt to level the playing field in that direction would have a chance of success in
the international arena today.
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the host country refused to enforce its antitrust law and thus refused to re-
strain its nationals from barring U.S. imports, and if personal jurisdiction
and comity concerns were satisfied, the United States would be likely to sue
in U.S. courts. 33
The hybrid (public/private) nature of the problem of closed foreign
markets and the possibility of a subject matter jurisdictional gap that could
frustrate antitrust enforcement by the harmed nation, qualify this issue spe-
cially for international discussion.
Four distinct problems present themselves in the context of market
access and trade. First, what is the nature of the overlap or the difference
between trade and antitrust concepts that safeguard market access? Second,
is there a commonly understood antitrust rule that applies to foreclosure-
type restraints? Third, is there a gap between recognized antitrust principles
that safeguard market access and appropriate principles for competition in
world trade? Fourth, even to the extent that antitrust rules are clear and
relatively harmonious, and even where a trade/antitrust gap is not the
problem, nations become embroiled in severe market access disputes of an
antitrust nature, and they often seem not to trust the institutions of one
another to resolve the dispute. In other words, there is a dispute-resolution
gap; recourse to an impartial decision-maker who is trusted to apply the rule
of law to the facts may be the most critical need.34 Thus, the fourth problem
is to devise a meaningful and legitimate dispute resolution system.
The first and second inquiries - the distinction between trade and
antitrust and the identification of a commonly accepted market-access anti-
trust rule - are important so that trade and competition authorities, even
within a single nation, can understand one another. The overlap between
trade and antitrust market-access rules is narrower than many trade experts
suppose. Liberal trade policy seeks centrally to restrain governments from
33 Department of Justice Releases of April 3, 1993, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,084 (Apr. 3,
1992). See Anne K. Bingaman, Change and Continuity in Antitrust Enforcement, Address Before the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York (Oct. 21, 1993), in 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,123 (1993)
(reaffirming the policy to use antitrust to open foreign markets).
34 If, for example, Americans perceive that they are excluded from Japanese markets by artificial
restraints, and if Japanese decision-makers (e.g., the Japan Fair Trade Commission) proceed to investigate
the matter and find merely that market forces were at play, tensions are likely to persist. If U.S. authorities
should proceed to pursue the matter in their own nation and if U.S. courts treat the issue as one for their
own competence and the U.S. fact-finder finds that Americans were excluded by a Japanese conspiracy in
Japan, tensions are likely to escalate, not dissolve. Escalation is likely to result unless there is a trusted
authority to which both sides can appeal.
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creating any distortions to trade. Foundational principles are: 1) free flow
of goods, 2) nondiscrimination, and 3) transparency of any direct or indirect
restraints. Therefore, a liberal trade policy is tough on government action,
quick to interfere with government action affecting trade, and ready to
assume that government action distorts trade.
A liberal antitrust policy also is tough on government; but for anti-
trust, this orientation tends to result in a weak rather than robust body of
law. While putting to one side cartels, which are by definition designed to
override the market, a liberal antitrust policy assumes that private action,
unfettered by government mandate (including antitrust law itself), tends to
increase trade, competition and efficiency. Indeed, some private restraints
(such as exclusive dealing contracts) may be important instruments of com-
petition and efficiency. Simply to call a private contractual term a
"restraint" evokes no negative presumptions. Thus, while government re-
straints that may affect market access are suspect and containment of such
restraints is at the core of trade analysis, private restraints that may affect
market access are not necessarily suspect, and a full antitrust analysis may
be performed without ever reaching the market access questions. A de-
scription of "consumer welfare" antitrust analysis may be helpful in
clarifying this point.
Antitrust law is intended to eliminate market imperfections that create
market power and give sellers incentives to act in disregard of the interests
of buyers. While some nations' antitrust laws have additional purposes, all
such laws seek to keep firms from getting or using power to override the
market.
In a non-cartel case involving, for example, exclusive dealing, the
antitrust analysis might start with the question whether the market is com-
petitive or noncompetitive or whether defendant lacks market power. If the
market is competitive or defendant lacks power, the analysis might stop
there, for firms without power are pressured by the forces of competition to
behave responsively to buyers. 35 A competitive market implies that there
are sufficient forces within the market to provide the right incentives to the
market actors. Thus, effective competition does not depend upon potential
competition, and the analysis need never consider whether there are would-
be importers who aspire to compete in the market.
35 See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 595-97 (lst Cir. 1993); Valley
Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1987).
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If the market is noncompetitive and defendant has market power, the
analysis proceeds further. One inquires whether defendant is employing the
restraint to use, maintain or increase its market power, on the one hand, or
to gain efficiencies and respond to buyers, on the other hand.36
There are two instances in which foreclosing restraints are deemed
anticompetitive in the consumer welfare sense. The first is the case of a
cartel involving a competitors' conspiracy to exclude outsiders and thus to
keep the market for themselves. This is a typical anticompetitive horizontal
restraint. The conduct is, by definition, intended to override the market. It
is illegal under antitrust laws virtually everywhere in the world.
The second is the case in which the restraint is vertical only (i.e., it is
not a result of agreement among competitors); but the market is concen-
trated, the firm employing the restraint has market power, the entrants
would limit the dominant firm's or oligopolist's market power, thereby
aiding consumers, and the entrants cannot penetrate the market in a
significant way due to the restraint. A restraint of this type is or may be
illegal under antitrust laws of all nations, although nations have a range of
differences. In some nations, such a restraint may be efficiency-justified.
Other nations' laws focus on access rights of would-be entrants and find
violations at a lower threshold.37 These are the common parameters of
antitrust law on market access.
36 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (Ist Cir. 1983).
37 For European Union law, see Hoffinann-La Roche v. Comm'n [1979] E.C.R 461. Hoffmann-La
Roche is compared with U.S. law in Eleanor Fox, MonopoFlzation and Dominance in the United States and
the European Community - Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 501 (1986)
[hereinafter Monopolization and Dominance].
For further EU precedent, see Case C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo & Ors v. Energiebedriif ljsselmij
NV, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 97,409 (1994) (a public undertaking may maintain exclusive purchas-
ing requirements that restrict competition and would otherwise violate the Treaty of Rome if the
restrictions are necessary to enable the undertaking to carry out the public tasks assigned to it); Scholler
Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG, 2 CEC (CCH) 2,101 (1993); Langnese-Iglo GmbH, 2 CEC (CCH) 2,123
(1993) (exclusive purchasing agreements between ice cream manufacturers and retailers in the German ice
cream market held to infringe Article 85(1) and not to be entitled to the benefits of the block exemption or
to an individual exemption under Article 85(3) because they strengthened the duopoly position of the firms
and made access to the retail ice cream market difficult).
Market access is an important concern in the EU's Exclusive Purchasing and Distribution
Regulations. In EU Commission Regulations, article 14 provides that exemptions under the Regulation
shall be withdrawn where "access by other suppliers to the different stages of distribution in a substantial
part of the common market is made difficult to a significant extent." Commission Regulation 1984/83 on
the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements 1983 O.J.
(L173/5), reprinted in 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733 (1983).
In other Commission Regulations, Article 6(b) similarly provides that exemptions shall be withdrawn
if the agreement makes access by other suppliers "difficult to a significant extent." Commission
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Third, we asked whether there is an unwelcome gap between the
above antitrust concepts on market access and appropriate principles of
world trade. The question suggests that antitrust law may be too limited in
its reach and therefore cannot fully address problems in world competition.
In connection with purely private restraints, one should be cautious in
concluding that there is such a gap. This is because, in a non-cartel context,
restraints on private firms' freedom to decide how they purchase inputs and
how they get to market may actually impair competition, efficiency, 38 and
world welfare. It may therefore be perverse to push nations towards a
common world antitrust rule that grants a higher level of market access
rights than nations choose for their own internal economies.
In some cases, however, the market access restraint is a hybrid public
and private restraint, bringing us to difficult territory that has not yet been
fully explored. There might be a gap between competition law and appro-
priate trade/competition rules in this area. The opportunity should be seized
to tear down the sometimes artificial wall between public and private re-
straints. Reference is made to the public/private problem in the State Action
discussion below.
Fourth, in the context of the market access problem, the absence of
recourse to a trusted, impartial decision-maker may reveal itself to be at the
heart of tensions, suggesting the particular need for attention to dispute
resolution.
3. Alleged Zealous Extraterritorial Enforcement
Zealous extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust law by U.S.
plaintiffs and U.S. courts has been widely identified as a source of interna-
tional tension. Indeed, enforcement of U.S. antitrust law - with its broad
discovery rights, private enforcement, class actions, treble damage remedies
Regulation 1983/83 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive
Distribution Agreements, reprinted in 2 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2730. See also Commission Notice on
Application of Article 85(3) to Categories of Exclusive Distribution and Exclusive Purchasing Agreements
84/C 101/2, reprinted in 2 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2702.
In the United States itself the legal principle governing exclusionary restraints is not wholly clear.
The law sometimes protects opportunities for competitors, although a focus on consumer welfare alone has
been called "the ascendant view." See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d at 597.
38 See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (application of the rule of per
se illegality to nonprice vertical restraints might undermine distribution and marketing efficiencies and
have adverse affects on interbrand competition).
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and criminal punishment - against nationals of the UK, Canada, Australia,
France and other nations, has triggered enactment of statutes to block U.S.
discovery and to "claw back" the two-thirds (penal) portion of foreign (U.S.
antitrust) judgments.39 Numerous commentators have suggested rules of
deference and restraint as solutions.40
The core of the problem that results in trade tensions is not centrally,
however, some nations' overzealous outreach in antitrust enforcement.
Efforts to bring to account foreign firms that cause direct and foreseeable
harms in a regulating nation's economy are simply a predictable response to
the interdependent world, combined with the fact that most nations do not
prohibit their firms from taking action that harms "only" foreigners.
Business conduct across the globe may directly harm competition in other
nations. This phenomenon occurs with more and more frequency as the
world economy becomes more international. The effects doctrine4 l was the
predictable response to nations' needs to protect themselves. It is no sur-
prise that some form of the effects doctrine is now accepted by virtually all
of the major trading nations.42
Antitrust enforcement against foreign firms is particularly unremark-
able in the case of private cartels targeted at a regulating nation's market
(i.e., the inbound trade problem). Cartelists should not be free of the victim
nation's law simply because they (the cartelists) are remote, while free of
their own nation's law because the harm is remote. By choosing to do busi-
ness in or into a country, they are bound to know its law and to accept the
consequences of violating the law, be it treble damages, broad discovery, or
jail.
39 Examples of blocking statutes include the following: Australian Foreign Proceedings (Excess of
Jurisdiction) Act, Act 3 (1984); Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. ch. F-29 (1985)
(Can.); Ontario Business Records Protection Act, R.S.C. ch. B-19. (1990) (Can.); U.K. Protection of
Tradi Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11.
q-See, eg., Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 783 (1984); Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing & Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMp.
L. 579 (1983).
41 The effects doctrine refers to the judicial inquiry engaged in by U.S. courts when deciding the ju-
risdictional reach of U.S. antitrust laws over foreign parties. See, e.g., Eleanor Fox, Extraterritoriality,
Antitrust, and the New Restatement: Is "Reasonableness" the Answer?, 19 N.YU. J. INT'L L. & POL. 565,
569-572 (1987).
42 THE RESTAMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403, rptrs. n. 3
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
See also Kurt Stockmann, Foreign Application of European Antitrust Laws, 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 251 (1986); Joseph P. Griffin, EC & US. Extraterritoriality: Activism and Cooperation, 17
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 353 (1994).
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Further as to inbound trade, if tension results from enforcement by
the regulating nation against foreign firms, the problem may be either
"narrow nationalism,"43 or the industrial policy of the actor's nation.
Regarding the former, nations would sometimes rather protect their own
citizens from even well-based antitrust enforcement abroad than cooperate
in advancing the mutual interest of nations against a cartelized world.44
Regarding the latter, cartel conduct may be actually or purportedly
government-authorized, or the collaborative conduct may be regulated and
it may be of a sort that is legal even if all of its harms fall in the home
country. The uranium cartel45 is an example of the former. The Laker
Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways litigation46 and the In re
Insurance Antitrust Litigation case47 are possible examples of the latter.
Moreover, there may be serious question as to whether defendants acted
concertedly or independently, and if defendants did act concertedly,
whether their agreement amounted to an illegal one. Additionally,
defendants may be distrustful of the decision-making process in foreign
courts. In such cases, outreaching enforcement initiatives do cause tensions
among nations.
Recently in the United States, initiatives have centered also on out-
bound trade. The Department of Justice has challenged restrictions imposed
by UK Pilkington that prevented U.S. and other firms from exporting to the
United Kingdom and other parts of the world. The challenge was settled by
consent decree removing the restrictions. 48 Statements by U.S. officials
suggest that additional challenges - perhaps against Japanese firms that
allegedly exclude U.S. exports to Japan, may be forthcoming.49
43 See generally ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21st
CENTURY CAPITALISM (1991). Robert Reich articulated the concept of"zero-sum nationalism" (we win or
they win) versus cosmopolitanism upon which I draw throughout this article. Id. at ch. 25.
44 Consider, in the Freddie Laker matter, the UK pressure to cause the United States to withdraw its
criminal information against British Airways, because the UK wanted to privatize British Airways and to
realize full value of the airline without the cloud of litigation. See generally GEOFFREY SMITH, REAGAN
AND THATCHER (1991).
45 See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); United Nuclear Corp. v.
General Atomic Co., 597 P.2d 290 (N. Mex. Sup. Ct), mandamus den., 454 U.S. 811 (1981).
46 See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
47 In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
48 United States v. Pilkington plc, 59 Fed. Reg. 30604 (June 14, 1994) (Proposed Final Judgment
and Competitive Impact Statement).
49 See Keith Bradsher, U.S. Sues British in Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at A1.
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Enforcement to protect opportunities for exporters has already pro-
voked claims of unilateralism and intrusion into another nation's
sovereignty.5 0 Use of the effects doctrine in outbound cases is on less es-
tablished footing than in inbound cases, even though it seems reasonable to
assert that trading nations (which, by definition, seek the benefits of open
markets abroad) should not countenance unjustified public or private re-
straints that close their markets at home. An international consensus may
exist that there is an outbound problem. The point on which the interna-
tional consensus has yet to develop is how to solve the outbound problem
- e.g., by recognizing the legitimacy of an antitrust challenge by the ex-
cluded nation, and/or by devising a system for dispute resolution.
Jurisdictional outreach does therefore give rise to tensions and it is
possible that those tensions can be sufficiently addressed only in the context
of a world agenda. Competition, fairness, legitimacy of process, and choice
of law are all at issue.
4. State Action, Act of State
Every nation has some form of a state action doctrine5 1 and an act of
state doctrine,52 exempting certain government acts from antitrust. This
subject is not principally about dissimilar and conflicting laws of nations;
the laws of nations are relatively similar. The problem is largely the over-
breadth in the law of all nations in shielding anticompetitive action that
harms other nations, while sometimes harming even its own consumers.
Government action may be in the form of subsidies, authorized export car-
tels, or standards which foreigners cannot know or cannot efficiently meet.
Some anticompetitive state action is subject to the GATT/WTO, while some
is not.53
50 See Yoshio Ohara, The New U.S. Policy on the Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust Laws, and
Japan's Response, 17 WORLD COMPETITION 49 (1994).
51 For examples of U.S. law regarding the state action doctrine, see Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eu Claire, 471 U.S. 34
(1985% For U.S. law regarding the act of state doctrine, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 443. See
also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 110 S. Ct. 701, 107 L.
Ed.2d 816 (1990).
53 The GATT regulates the provision of export subsidies and other subsidies that seriously prejudice
the interests of another contracting state. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947,
art. VI, XVI, TIAS 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. See also Agreement on Interpretation and Application of
Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the GAIT, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513 (1979) [hereinafter antidumping
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The most widely cited case in point is government authorization of
export cartels, whereby a nation, even if it prohibits cartels at home, might
encourage export price-fixing, profiting the nation by exploiting "the for-
eigners." 54
The Motorola incident in Japan is another case in point. Motorola, a
producer of cellular telephones, depended on the Japanese government to
assign it frequencies in Japan and to create the infrastructure that would en-
able its phones to work (as Japan had agreed with the United States that it
would do). Japan assigned the task to Nippon Telephone & Telegraph,
which had its own technology and had incentives not to promote the tech-
nology and the business of Motorola.55
In a third situation, government-owned businesses or state-designated
(e.g. licensed) private monopolies procure their goods and services only
from national sources, and in a fourth, nations maintain significant "buy-
national" programs that have distinct lasting effects in steering purchases
away from foreign goods.
A fifth situation is more ambiguous: a nation (or a subdivision
thereof) takes action to cure a failing market (e.g., it orders a crisis cartel)
and it fulfills the exempting requirements of its law, but the anticompetitive
effects are felt as distinctly or more distinctly in other nations while the
benefits are captured by the acting nation.
If one were to solve the problem of externalities in the interests of the
citizen of the community of nations, conceding a proper role for subsidiar-
ity, one would prohibit export cartels56 and government-sponsored
and subsidies code]. These provisions were supplemented by a new subsidies agreement negotiated during
the Uruguay Round. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures [hereinafter the
Agreement on Subsidies]; Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, pt. II Ann. IA-8, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. I [hereinafter
Final Act].
54 For an analysis of the legal treatment of export cartels by the major industrial nations, see Report
of the ABA Antitrust Section Special Committee on International Antitrust, 1991 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST
REP. ch. 3 (Barry E. Hawk, Chair).
55 Barnaby J. Feder, Motorola Long a Backer of Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1994, at D7. The
dispute was resolved by an agreement between the United States and Japan giving Motorola greater access
to the Japanese cellular phone market. See David P. Hamilton, Motorola Resolves Cellular Dispute with
Japan's IDO, WALL ST. J., Mar. I1, 1994, at A8.
56 Three objections are made to limiting states' freedom to order export cartels. One, export collabo-
ration may be necessary for small exporters to achieve efficiencies they could not otherwise gain and thus
necessary to promote exports. Second, export cartels may be necessary to protect a nation's exporters from
destructive competition against one another. Third, nations (e.g., Japan) may be responding to another
nation's (e.g., the United States') request or "interests" to prevent flooding the market, which itself would
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discrimination, including barriers with equivalent effects to tariffs and
quotas as well as government procurement unless justified by a tightly-
drawn public interest (e.g., national defense) standard. One would also
prohibit or regulate state anticompetitive action that injured neighbors more
than itself, and at least require transparency and justification.
There is currently a gaping hole in the international trad-
ing/competition system. The state action doctrine is an antitrust doctrine,
not a trade doctrine, and it assumes "virtual representation." 57 The principal
harms as well as the principal benefits from anticompetitive state action
normally fall within the state, and the interests of the state's citizens are
protected by the state. In the increasingly global economy, however, trans-
national spill-over harms are more likely to occur and are likely to be more
pronounced when they do occur. The act of state doctrine is a foreign
relations doctrine, not a trade doctrine. Its genesis is political, not
economic. It relies upon a notion of sovereignty constructed before the
modem economic appreciation of the benefits provided by integration of
nations' economies. Some means must be devised for closing the gap
between GATT-illegal conduct and acts of states or nations that lie outside
of the traditional world trade law yet impose unacceptable costs on the
world trading system.
The European Union ("EU') is far advanced in dealing with these
problems, for in the European internal market there is no trade law. All
former trade law problems have been reconceptualized as distortion-of-
be likely to trigger imposition of national trade barriers such as local content regulation or antidumping
duties.
The answer to the first objection is that export collaborations to achieve efficiencies are not export
cartels (to override the market). We make the distinction between procompetitive and anticompetitive
cartels every day for our internal markets. There is no reason why we cannot make the distinction in
matters of trade.
The second objection is an objection to competition itself. Normally, competition should be pre-
sumed beneficial. If a nation - such as China in its silk export trade - experiences destructive below cost
export competition, the nation can control the problem by publicizing what happens when firms engage in
sustained sales below marginal or average variable cost, and it can prohibit such sales. While below-cost-
sales laws are difficult to administer in an efficient way and should have narrow scope, a well-drafted law
of this genre is a less blunt instrument than a policy to bless cartels.
The third objection is even more intractable. It involves enormous amounts of lobbying dollars, and
is highly political. Domestic businesses may seek to buy as much protection as they can get, up to the
point where the cost of protection exceeds the losses from foreign competition (or the cost of re-tooling to
compete in a global environment). The interests of the citizen of the community at large lie clearly against
such investment in protection. Regulation that would limit states' rights to respond to claims for protection
would give state officials needed support to resist anticompetitive private-interest measures.
5 See JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 82-87, 100-01 (1980).
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
competition problems. The EC Treaty of Rome and the European Union
case law are rich" with precedents for working out these problems in the
mutual economic interests of a community of nations. 58
5. Antidumping Law/Antitrust Policy
Nations have antidumping laws that prohibit imports sold at less than
"fair value" 59 if the imports materially injure a domestic industry. The
world trading regime does not promote antidumping laws; rather, it tolerates
them.60
Antidumping laws create a trading tension, but the most direct ten-
sion is internal to each nation. For the United States, the tension is between
U.S. antitrust policy, which encourages sustainable low pricing not en route
to creating monopoly or oligopoly power, and U.S. antidumping law, which
chills just such low pricing in order to shield a domestic industry from
prices judged to be "unfair." International tensions may result, because
Nation A's competitively low-priced goods may be taxed on entry into
Nation B, and A's firms may perceive that they have been denied fair mar-
ket access. Or, absent dumping duties, beleaguered firms in Nation B may
claim harm from the "unfair" prices of products imported from A.
One might in theory expect each nation to examine its own problem
and to reconcile the tension between its antitrust policy and its antidumping
law. One might expect the United States to worry about harm to intermedi-
ate buyers who are forced to buy overpriced inputs and thus are set back in
their competition in world markets; to worry about harm to overcharged
consumers; and perhaps to retrain and redirect workers whose jobs are lost
to competition, rather than to take action to preserve existing higher-cost
domestic producers. But, other than in areas such as the European common
market and the European Economic Area, wherein charging dumping duties
58 See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, chs.
9, 18,25 (1993).
59 Under U.S. law, "less than fair value" means less than home country price; if there is no home
country price (i.e., if home market sales do not exceed 5% of the exporter's total export sales), it means
less than third country prices. If that benchmark is unavailable, "fair value" is deemed to be a constructed
cost derived from an evaluation of costs and standard profits for the type of exporter involved. See 19
U.S.C. § 1673; see also 19 C.F.R. ch. III, § 353.42-353.60 (1991).
60 See Final Act, supra note 53, art. VI; see also antidumping and subsidies code, supra note 53.
The Uruguay Round introduced a new agreement on antidumping which will revise the antidumping code.
See Agreement on the Implementation of art. VI of GATT 1994, in Final Act, supra note 53.
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is a clear violation of the law, this internal examination and reconciliation is
not occurring. The politics of reconciliation are formidable. Even within
the North American Free Trade area, antidumping laws presently remain
intact.
In the context of our world trading system, with its falling barriers,
incentives towards ratcheting down the dumping-duty barrier could increase
for three reasons. First, intensified world competition puts pressure on na-
tions to assure their intermediate producers access to lowest price inputs.
Second, as barriers insulating national markets fall, nations have less oppor-
tunity to shelter their own firms, and the firms have less opportunity to
make the ultracompetitive profits that gave them flexibility to charge prices
as low as marginal cost abroad. As opportunity for "unfairness" through
price discrimination thus diminishes, importing nations may be less anxious
about according national treatment to their neighbors' goods. Third, from a
(narrow) political perspective, nations may view the "right" to impose anti-
dumping duties as a valuable chit, not to be relinquished unilaterally. As
nations become more attuned to decision-making in their common interests,
or if they simply value sufficiently the reciprocal benefit - the right to na-
tional treatment in the trading partners' markets - they may be more likely
to rein in their antidumping laws.
6. Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Law and Antitrust Policy
Nations give subsidies to firms and industries in various forms. Some
are GATT-illegal and may be subject to a nation's countervailing duties. 6 1
Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, there is a greater opportunity to
challenge subsidies. 62
61 GATT law prior to the Uruguay Round prohibited export subsidies except on primary products,
and urged parties "to avoid injuring the domestic industries of another signatory" when they use other
types of subsidies. Signatories could impose duties to countervail subsidies that violate the GATT pro-
vided the nation complied with procedures outlined in the countervailing duties code. See Final Act, supra
note 53, art. VI, XVI. See also antidumping and subsidies code, supra note 53.
62 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies will probably result in increased challenges to sub-
sidies. It clarifies many of the ambiguities in the predecessor antidumping and subsidies codes. For
example, unlike its predecessor, the Uruguay Round Agreement defines subsidies and then sub-divides
subsidies into categories, and specifies the legal status of each. A subsidy is defined as a financial contri-
bution by a government that confers a benefit. The constraints set out in the Agreement apply only to
subsidies that are "specific," which, for the most part, are those that are available only to an enterprise, in-
dustry, or group of enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of the authority granting the subsidy.
"Prohibited subsidies" are those contingent upon export performance and those conditional upon the use of
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Subsidies are normally inefficient. They create artificially large de-
mand for the subsidized product, which is sold below its cost. Therefore
subsidies create inefficiencies in the allocation of resources.
While they may sometimes be justified as necessary to correct market
failures, subsidies create a tension. They create a tension between one na-
tion's right to implement industrial policy (by supporting chosen business
or industry) and other nations' businesses' right to compete on the merits.
From a U.S. perspective, the conflict is one of trade law versus anti-
trust theory. From a European Union internal market perspective, the
linkage is even closer. The subject of "state aids" (including subsidies) is a
part of EC competition law and is a subject within the competence of the
Competition Directorate. Because the EU articulates competition policy as
the interest in "undistorted competition," and because state aids by one
member state to its businesses distort competition within the common mar-
ket, it is easy to see why the European competition law umbrella covers
state aids.
In the EU, state aids must be reported, and they must be justified in
accordance with specified standards, or eliminated. 63 While the system
works far from perfectly, it provides a framework for dealing with a ten-
sion-provoking problem, and a more direct and complete approach than that
provided by the GATT/WTO.
C. Identifying the Opportunities
1. The Integral Global Transaction
Gains in trade and competition may also flow from an integrated view
of the world. Increasingly, transactions or patterns of conduct are integral
transnational transactions. Their benefits and costs cannot be appreciated
without vision from the top. A law as broad as the transactions it regulates
must necessarily have positive qualities.
domestic goals in preference to imported goods. "Actionable subsidies" are those that cause adverse ef-
fects to the interests of other signatories. The final category of subsidies is "non-actionable." This
category includes non-specific subsidies and various specified specific subsidies. See the Agreement on
Subsidies, supra note 53.
63 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, arts. 92-94, 298
U.N.T.S. 3, 51 A.J.I.L. 865 (1957) [hereinafter the EC Treaty]. The EC Treaty, as amended by the
Maastricht Treaty, can be found in 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 25,400.
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In the late 1880s, the Rockefeller Standard Oil Trust was formed in
Ohio. It combined most of the refiners of oil in the nation under one roof.
Ohio sued the oil trust for violation of the state antitrust laws. The trust dis-
solved and incorporated in New Jersey. 64
A century later the United States withdrew its 16-year old antitrust
lawsuit against IBM, perhaps because it feared that success in the lawsuit
would handicap an exemplary, inventive global producer. The European
Community began proceedings against IBM Europe and announced that it
would seek relief requiring IBM to disclose changes in its main frame inter-
faces in advance of IBM's marketing the new products so that IBM's
competitors in the supply of peripheral plug-in attachments would not be set
back in their competition. U.S. officials argued that the relief proposed by
the EC officials would harm IBM worldwide and that it would harm U.S.
technological progress, while EC officials argued, to the contrary, that the
relief would enhance competition and progressiveness. 65 A settlement be-
tween IBM and the EC followed, 66 but had there not been a settlement, the
European Commission and the EC Court of Justice might well have ordered
the disclosure based on their view of what is good for competition. No in-
stitution extant had the competence to assess whether the relief would have
been good or bad for the broader community of nations. No institution is in
place to hear, impartially, the voices of those claimed to be harmed by one
nation's externality.
In the 1990s, firms within nations and across nations are contemplat-
ing combinations to build a data superhighway. A given cooperative effort
(with or without safeguards for access) might be a benefit for the world or it
might be a monopolistic monster. If we do not have a unified understanding
of global impacts, and perhaps a unified legal treatment, one nation might
strike down a blessing for the world, or all nations might lack the tools to
control a manipulative monster.
Because of externalities and common goods, some problems cannot
be appropriately solved except by a common solution. Environmental
problems are commonly cited as the paradigmatic example. U.S. clean air
will not stay clean, despite high and well-enforced environmental standards,
64 See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 38-41 (1911).
65 For a discussion of the U.S. and the European proceedings against IBM, see E. Fox,
Monopolization and Dominance, supra note 37, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 100-15.
66 The settlement is reprinted in full at [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8708; [1982-1984] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,608.
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unless cross-border Mexican or cross-border Canadian air is similarly
treated. Externalities and the common good is one important reason why
environmental law is likely to appear on the agenda of the WTO. The
"integrated whole" problem is a reason why antitrust law, likewise, is a
candidate for common policy, or at least for a forum in which to confront
the problems for the common good.
2. Harmonies and Synergies
Freer trade creates opportunities for trade and competition policies to
work together. As trade restraints are lifted, existing private restrictions be-
come more apparent, and private firms may be motivated to preserve their
customary turf by new private restraints.
Moreover, as trade becomes freer and the world becomes more nearly
integrated, gaps become more apparent in and between trade and antitrust
law in dealing with artificial restraints that block the free movement of
goods, services and capital.
The law of the European Union has a unified approach to such re-
straints in the internal European market, and its basic economic blueprint
holds lessons for the rest of the world on how harmonies and synergies may
be achieved. The EC Treaty of Rome prohibits member state restraints on
free movement of goods, services and capital across state borders, and it as-
sures freedom to establish business across borders. The law prohibits
discrimination based on nationality. 67 It aggressively reaches disguised as
well as obvious restraints. Dumping duties in the internal market are pro-
hibited, and (in theory) subsidies are transparent and controlled.68 The
competition law explicitly goes hand in hand with the free movement law;
government enterprises and government licensing of exclusive rights are
subject to the competition principles. Anticompetitive state legislation is
subject to limits. 69 Government procurement is constrained by rules of non-
discrimination. Standards, such as telecom standards, are required to be
67 EC Treaty, supra note 63, art. 7.
68 Regarding subsidies, see EC Treaty, supra note 63, arts. 92-93. Regarding the tension between
free movement and availability of antidumping duties, see generally John Temple Lang, Reconciling
European Community Antitrust and Antidumping, Transport and Trade Safeguard Policies - Practical
Problems, in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. ch. 7 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989).
69 See EC Treaty, supra note 63, arts. 3(f) (now 3(g)), 5(2), 30, 85, 86, 101 and 102. See BERMAN,
GOEBEL, DAVEY & FOX, supra note 57, at 882.
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transparent and not to operate as non-tariff barriers. The common policies,
and linkages of national policies to one another, are (again, in theory)
subject to the principle of subsidiarity to preserve national autonomy and
diversity. Decisions that can best be taken at a lower (e.g. national) level
should be taken at the lower level.70
While any world compact for competition and trade would be differ-
ent from that of the European Union, which arose from a political need at
the end of World War II and aspires to be more tightly integrated than the
rest of the world, lessons may be learned and adapted from the European
internal market blueprint. Though far from perfect in its execution, it offers
a model to achieve free competition and trade, undistorted by artificial gov-
ernment or private action.
V. A INIMAL BUT UNITARY SYSTEM FOR GLOBAL COMPETITION
Specified below is a targeted approach to the problems raised and op-
portunities identified for a world competition/trading regime.7 1 The
principles are based on the notion of a community of nations, commonly
striving to create robust and competitive business and to enhance competi-
tion, efficiency and technological progress for the benefit of the
citizen/consumer of the larger community. The system is dependent on na-
tional enforcement of existing law and shared principles of law, with
recourse to impartial dispute resolution in the event of conflicts and global
impacts.7 2
70 See EC Treaty, supra note 63, art. 3(b). The subsidiarity principle was added to the EC Treaty by
the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht). See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, reprinted in 3
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 25,300. See generally The Handler Lecture, supra note 8, at 566.
71 This is a refinement of principles I have suggested elsewhere. See Introduction to Munich Code,
supra note 29; The Handler Lecture, supra note 8, at 567-75.
72 The reader may wish to also consider the remarks of Claus Dieter Ehlermann, Director General,
DG IV:
The Commission is in favor of a multilateral approach to anticompetitive practices of
companies....
With the WTO following the GATIT, there can only be an increase in the level of commit-
ment of the world's trading partners towards competition and increased trade. As part of its
immediate agenda, the WTO should cover competition policy issues, focusing particularly on
restrictive business practices and cartels. The aim should be to establish minimum substantive
rules and lay down procedures for the effective enforcement of these rules by the contracting
parties. The enforcement measures should be strict in order to provide the positive market-
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A. Substantive Principles
1. The contracting nations should articulate strong shared antitrust
principles of relevance to the world trading/competition system. These
principles should be: 1) an anti-cartel rule, subject to the right of a nation to
adopt tailored, transparent derogations to address intemal market problems;
and 2) a market access rule, contemplating that markets not be blocked by
artificial restraints that harm competition. 73
2. The nations should agree to incorporate or maintain these consen-
sus principles in their national antitrust laws. They should agree to extend
their national laws in scope so that each regulating nation treats harm
caused by its nationals to competition, efficiency or technological progress
anywhere in the community of nations as seriously as it treats harm within
its borders. The nations should agree to enforce the consensus principles,
especially when the harm is to another contracting nation.
3. The nations should agree that they will not authorize, encourage or
carry out any anticompetitive act where a principal effect is harm to other
contracting nations.
opening effects needed for a strong multilateral agreement. In addition, the right to recourse to
GATT panels should be strengthened, as should the effectiveness of adjudications.
Any multilateral agreement on competition would have to provide for agreement on com-
petition rules, for reinforced cooperation procedures between the competition authorities
involved, for an improved exchange of information, as well as for effective enforcement meas-
ures.
Claus Dieter Ehlermann, speech delivered in Brussels (June 22, 1994). For an approach that is at first
minimal but increasingly ambitious, beginning with transparency and graduating to investigations regard-
ing cartels, later monopolistic practices, and later mergers, and requiring compulsory licensing of
technology to dissipate persistent control of world trade in certain statistical categories, see F.M. SCHERER,
supra note 5, at 91-96.
73 While the formulation of an appropriate world market-access principle would be a formidable
task, this proposal does not contemplate such a task. Rather, nations would formulate (as they have formu-
lated) their own rules. As the jurisdictional principle below contemplates, if a restraint is essentially an
internal market restraint, it is governed by the law of the nation within which it occurs. See Private Int'l
Law of Switzerland, infra note 77. Thus, if Japanese firms exclude U.S. imports by reason of a vertical
distribution restraint in Japan, the legality of the restraint is tested by the vertical restraint law of Japan, and
vice versa. The agreement suggested would not direct nations as to how they must formulate their market
access rule, but simply require that they must have one.
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4. The nations should adopt and enforce principles of national treat-
ment of other contracting nations' goods and services, and should move
towards the same ends for capital and freedom of establishment.
5. Each nation should bring its antidumping rules more nearly into
correspondence with its antitrust price-predation rules, with a view to en-
couraging sustainable low-price competition.
6. The nations should develop a short list of principles or subject
areas as to which certain freedoms of action are important to a world of
freer competition (e.g., to engage in certain R&D joint ventures, networks
and alliances), and should develop either common principles, jurisdictional
rules of priority and deference, or procedures for adjudication of conflicts so
that no one nation could obstruct covered transactions whose dominant
effect is to enhance competition, efficiency or technological progress in the
community of nations.
B. Enforcement, Jurisdiction and Dispute Resolution
1. Nations whose competition or commerce is injured by consensus
wrongs74 launched from or in another contracting nation may request the
authorities of the injuring nation 75 to enforce the injuring nation's antitrust
law, and failing satisfaction, they should be accorded the right in the injur-
ing nation to seek enforcement of the latter's antitrust law. The right of
action should be an effective one, accompanied by appropriate access to in-
formation. Alternatively, failing satisfaction, the injured nation should be
accorded the right to bring action in its own nation.76
74 This term refers to violation of the consensus principles in the agreement. Alternatively,
"consensus principles" could include all common principles of an injuring and injured nation, e.g., a
common proscription of anticompetitive mergers.
75 "Injuring nation" is used to mean the nation of the firm or firms that allegedly cause the antitrust
harm by conduct within that nation. "Injured nation" is used to mean the nation whose citizens or firms
experience the harm. Normally the harm experienced would be harm to the competition process in the in-
jured nation, but it could also be harm to exporters of a nation blocked from foreign markets by
anticompetitive conduct.
76 Private persons have certain rights under the existing systems of law, and these would remain in
tact. Where new rights are contemplated, it would seem wise to confine such rights to governments, which
can act as a screen, pressing only those claims that they judge to be meritorious and of national or com-
munity importance.
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2. Nations should develop and agree to principles of permissible and
impermissible use of national law to reprehend acts of persons of another
contracting nation performed largely on the territory of the latter nation.
Nations should accept as permissible use of national law to reprehend such
acts if the acts are consensus wrongs under the agreement or facial wrongs
under the law of both the injuring and injured nation and they significantly
affect the regulating nation's commerce. Nations should regard as imper-
missible use of national law to reprehend acts of foreign persons on such
persons' home territory if the acts are neither consensus wrongs nor facial
wrongs under the law of the actors' nation and they are essentially internal
market transactions within the actors' nation.77
3. A system should be devised for resolution of disputes that cannot
be resolved in national courts or by the nations themselves. A panel com-
prised of experts from the disputing nations and an impartial nation might
be authorized to hear the claim of one nation against another nation, with a
right of appeal to an appellate tribunal. Such recourse should be available at
least on grounds that the respondent nation has failed to carry out in good
faith its responsibilities under the agreement. Competence of the panel
should include instances of both inaction by a nation that causes harm to
another and excessive action by a nation that causes harm to another. In the
first instance the panel could have power to issue an order to a nation to en-
force its national law; in the second, when one nation's enforcement
interferes unduly with competition, efficiency or technological progress in
the territory of another nation or in the larger community, the panel could
have power to issue an order of noninterference. The dispute resolution
system should follow an adjudicatory and rule-of-law model, not a com-
promise model. The designers of the system might profit from references to
NAFTA78 and GATT/Uruguay Round79 dispute resolution.
77 In other words, if antitrust harms are caused, the effects fall primarily within the actors' nation. In
cases of internal market transactions, however, a nation whose nationals suffer antitrust injury should be
entitled to recourse. If the nation can and does maintain suit in its own courts, the defendant should be
entitled to application of the law of its own nation. See Private Int'l Law of Switzerland, art. 137(1)
("Claims of restraint of competition are governed by the law of the country in whose market the restraint
directly affects the damaged or injured party.") Federal Statute on Private Int'l Law of Dec. 18, 1987.
78 The North American Free Trade Agreement done at Washington, D.C. on December 8 and 17,
1992, at Ottawa on December 11 and 17, 1992, and at Mexico City on December 14 and 17, 1992, chs. 19,
20, H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289, 682-98 (1993). For a dis-
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C. Cooperation and Transparency
1. For efficiency in enforcement, nations' antitrust authorities should
cooperate, along lines contemplated by the U.S./EC Executive Agreement
of 1991 and by the U.S. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act.
For efficiency of business, the agencies should harmonize certain proce-
dures to avoid costly redundancies. Most obviously, they should agree to a
common merger notification and reporting form, and at the option of the
merging parties, a central filing system.
2. Nations should make their antitrust law and its applications trans-
parent. They may do so by issuing guidelines or analyses of hypothetical
fact patterns. They may do so by periodic workshops among enforcers and
academic experts, comparing their respective applications of law to facts
and identifying and explaining differences.
Other efforts are necessary to remove distortions in competition. For
example, state aids, including subsidies, are distorting, and the time may
come when trading nations require reporting and justification, under speci-
fied rules, of all trade-affecting subsidies, as in the EU internal market.-
Transparency in standards, nondiscrimination in government procurement,
and national treatment of foreign investments are important initiatives to
remove distortions. These problems are not treated in this focused agenda,
in part because they are items of continuing discussion in world trade talks,
and in part because they are one step removed from the inner core of com-
petition policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having specified the problems and opportunities, and having identi-
fied a minimal but unitary system, we are in a position to reconsider the
cussion of NAFTA's dispute resolution mechanism see Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York on the North American Free Trade Agreement, 49 REC. ASS'N B. CITY OF N.Y. 143, 158 (1993).
79 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, pt. i, Ann. 2
of Uruguay Round Agreements, Final Act, supra note 53, at 112. For a discussion of the new GATT
-dispute resolution system, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in
the New GA7T, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477,481 (1994).
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three approaches to the problem of restraints in competition and trade,
namely: 1) the comprehensive approach: a world competition code; 2) the
targeted issue-and-opportunity approach with trade/competition linkages of
a constitutional dimension and room for growth of world policy from the
bottom up; and 3) the solely-national approach, based on national enforce-
ment and reciprocal agency cooperation, when and as the agencies choose
to cooperate.
The comprehensive approach is very likely to produce a code of un-
wise rules - the result of trade-offs - or rules so generalized that they are
meaningless. If agreement could be reached on rules acceptable to the
trading nations, the approach is most likely to produce undue bureaucracy,
contested applications of the rules, and more rather than less tension among
nations. Moreover, the approach necessarily requires nations to cede con-
trol over the formulation and interpretation of rules of law.
Since the third (national only, with reciprocity) approach contem-
plates the least change, we may ask the following questions. Do we gain
everything we need by the solely-national approach? What if anything is
lost by the solely-national approach that is gained by a more comprehensive
approach? And if something is lost by the solely-national approach, what
exactly would be the loss, particularly the claimed loss of sovereignty, en-
tailed by the targeted constitutional approach?
While national enforcement with cooperation by foreign agencies is
important and can go far to solve many problems of restraints in interna-
tional commerce, something very important is lost by a view of world
policy seen from the eyes of national interest. The thing that is lost is a vi-
sion of community. Vision of community is not mere altruism. It is
supported by a practical reality of cosmopolitanism that promises to benefit
business, consumers, and all participants in the economic enterprise. It
promises non-discrimination, a check on beggar-thy-neighbor strategies,
efficiency, fluidity, and economic opportunity. It would provide a fail-safe
forum for resolution of disputes on a cosmopolitan, not a nationalistic, ba-
sis. As a by-product of the integrated trade/competition system, the targeted
constitutional approach would provide legitimacy to the use of antitrust
lawsuits to protect exporters' rights to be free of anticompetitive restraints.
The expanded vision brings the most basic precepts of competition
policy into synchronization with the global economy and enables business
and consumers to realize gains. It enhances competition on the merits by
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making it more transparent, and by containing national industrial strategies
that distort competition by imposing costs on others. Like the national
approach, the targeted constitutional approach encourages the competition
of systems with regard to substantive antitrust rules and procedures.
If a measure of national autonomy is "lost" by the targeted constitu-
tional approach, it is lost only in the following ways and senses, which the
reader may recognize as a diminished "right" to narrow nationalism:
" As to consensus antitrust principles on cartels and market access,
business actors would be obliged to avoid antitrust harms to foreign-
ers, and the nations of the perpetrators would be obliged to give the
harmed foreigners recourse to law and remedies.
" As to antitrust harms that result from internal market transactions in
another nation, complainants would be obliged to accept as applicable
the law of the latter nation.
• Nations would give up the right to take action that is profitable to
them because it shifts the costs to another nation.
* Nations would limit their right to discriminate against foreign goods
and services, and against foreign goods sold at competetively low
prices.
" Nations that default in the good faith execution of their responsibili-
ties may be called to account in dispute resolution proceedings (in
which they would participate in the choice of the panel); and since the
proceedings would be judicial, not legislative, they would not be able
to vote their way out of a judgment against them.
Importantly, under the targeted constitutional approach, a nation
would not give up the right to formulate and interpret its own rules of law.
National law would be applied. Nations would merely be obliged to have
and enforce law on the two points most critical to trade - cartels and
market access; and they would be obliged to increase the transparency of
interpretations accorded to national law.
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In short, what is lost by the targeted constitutional approach as com-
pared with the solely-national approach is something that ought to be lost:
the license of a nation and its nationals to cause antitrust harm to others, or
unduly to impose their standards on others. What is gained is the gains of
competition and trade, and the gains from dispute resolution on a world-
welfare basis by institutions designed to be accepted as legitimate.
